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Abstract 
 
 
This paper emphasises that, for the less advanced European Union countries, FDI inflows 
are an important engine of convergence towards their more advanced counterparts. In general, 
CEECs and Cohesion countries hosting FDI tend to grow faster than those receiving few FDI. 
Not only the level but also the sectoral composition of FDI matters. Multinational 
corporations, by carrying out technically demanding production functions, have contributed to 
upgrade the production capacities of receiving CEECs and to increase the technological level 
of goods produced there. Competing on similar markets, but with higher wages and lower 
human capital endowments than CEECs, Portugal has lost its “comparative advantage” with 
the entry of CEECs as a possible destination of export-oriented FDI. This “diverting effect” 
explains a part of the disappointing performances of Portugal in terms of catching up. Thus, 
the relevant issue is no longer whether CEECs will follow an Irish or a Portuguese 
convergence scenario, but rather whether Portugal will converge or diverge towards CEECs. 
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Introduction 
“Cohesion” across member states is one of the main goal of the European Community 
since its creation in 1957 (Treaty of Rome). “Cohesion” in the European Union (EU) means 
promoting good living standards for all its inhabitants via trade of goods, capital and labour, 
exchange of knowledge, realisation of scale economies etc. Such a goal was firmly reaffirmed 
after the fall of the Berlin wall when perspectives of EU membership were offered to ten 
formerly socialist economies, plagued by 40-50 years of planned economy. Since 1st May 
2004, eight of them are new members of the EU while Bulgaria and Romania are expected to 
join EU by 20071. As well known, CEECs are by far poor countries compared to most of 
other EU countries, even if they have resumed with growth over the last decade. To which 
extent (and speed) these less advanced countries of the EU will converge towards EU average 
is a crucial issue. A slow convergence would necessitate to increase the European budget 
beyond the 1.24 % ceiling of the EU GNI to foster their economic development and reduce 
income inequalities while the more advanced EU countries are currently very reluctant to this 
perspective.  
Assessing the speed of convergence for CEECs is not an easy task: they have only a short 
experience of market economy, with the first years of transition characterised by disrupted 
economic relationships. Consequently, from a statistical viewpoint, not more than ten years of 
“reliable” data are available for CEECs. Nevertheless, some insights can be drawn by using 
the past experience of the four “Cohesion countries”, namely Spain, Portugal, Greece and 
Ireland. The latter were for a long time the four poorest countries of the EU-15, receiving the 
bulk of European funds. Over the time, these countries have experimented a very different 
path of convergence towards EU-15, such as Ireland is currently the second “richest” EU 
countries − after Luxembourg − in terms of per capita GDP (Table 1)2. By contrast, Greece 
and Portugal experimented poor performances in terms of catching up. As a result, 
considering the enlarged EU, Greece is roughly as rich as Slovenia (the more advanced 
CEECs among new EU members) and Portugal as rich as the Czech republic (the second one 
more advanced CEECs among new EU members). While various factors may explain these 
different paths of per capita GDP growth (including receipts of structural funds and pre-
accession funds from the EU), foreign direct investment (FDI, hereafter) is rather a good 
candidate. Indeed, Cohesion countries and CEECs have received individually very different 
amounts of FDI. Moreover, the sectoral composition of FDI is rather different from one 
country to another. In some countries, the bulk of FDI was made in capital and/or skilled 
intensive industries (e.g. Ireland for Cohesion countries; Hungary for CEECs) while in 
another countries, FDI were predominantly oriented towards unskilled labour and/or 
resources intensive industries (e.g. Portugal for Cohesion countries; Lithuania for CEECs). 
Since industries exhibit very different productivity growth, it may explain the shaping of 
previous - and then, future - per capita GDP growth. 
To which extent the difference of FDI inflows (both in terms of level and sectoral 
composition) may explain the difference of per capita GDP growth across countries is the 
main goal of this study. 
                                                          
1 In what follows, these ten formerly socialist countries will be labelled CEECs (for Central and Eastern 
European countries). New EU members are Estonia, the Czech republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Slovenia (hereafter, CEECs-8), plus the two Mediterranean islands, Cyprus and Malta. 
2 Note that the picture is a little bit different if we consider the gross national product (GNP) instead of the 
gross domestic product (GDP). Due to net large transfers to abroad, GNP in Ireland accounted for around 85 % 
of its GDP over the last few years. Inversely, due to net large transfers from abroad, GNP in Luxembourg stands 
between 110 and 115 % of its GDP, depending on years. For the other EU-15 countries, GNP and GDP are 
roughly in line.  
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The study is structured as follows. Section 1 presents some evidence on the process of 
convergence across EU members and on key factors that can help to explain the different 
paths of per capita GDP growth. Section 2 proposes a comparative overview of CEECs and 
Cohesion countries at the sectoral level. Section 3 consists in an accounting exercise aiming 
at analysing to which extent productive structures of CEECs are close or far away of those of 
Ireland. While section 1 uses the per capita GDP as a measure of convergence, the analysis 
carried out in sections 2 and 3 is based on productivity developments since “productivity 
growth is the basis for improvements in real incomes and welfare” (Schreyer and Pilat, 2001). 
Finally, section 4 concludes on the prospects of convergence in the enlarged EU. 
 
Table 1: Per capita GDP* in the enlarged EU and average growth rate of real GDP 
 
 
 Source: Eurostat.  
  * Per capita GDP are evaluated in PPPs. ** Over 1995/2004, except Malta and Romania over 
 1999/2004. 
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1. Convergence across EU members: an overview 
 
1.1. Key concepts and evidence for EU-15 countries 
 
Convergence across countries refers to the idea that the less advanced countries grow 
faster than their more advanced counterparts, such as the former catch up − or, converge 
towards − the latter. From a statistical viewpoint, it means that whether countries are 
converging, a negative relationship must be observed between their initial incomes and 
growth rates in the following years. Figure 1 presents evidence on per capita GDP 
convergence for the EU-15 over 1960-20043. The estimation of unconditional β-convergence 
across EU-15 countries, which measures the speed of convergence without controlling for 
factors which may impact on the speed of convergence (including EU membership), gives a 
convergence rate of about 2.5 % per year over the 45 last years (Table 2). It is worth noting 
this figure is above the 2 % found in the previous literature for other sets of countries or 
regions4. Thus, at first glance, EU membership would accelerate the convergence across 
countries5. 
As a rough approximation, let's assume that the initial per capita GDP of CEECs-8 as a 
whole is equal to 50 % of EU-15 average6. Then, based on this 2.5 % speed of convergence 
across EU-15 over 1960-2004, it means that in 20 years, the CEECs-8 as a whole would reach 
75 % of the EU-15 average. 
 
Figure 1: EU-15 countries over 1960-2004 y = -1,5287x + 16,292
R2 = 0,7864
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 Data sources: Chelem, CEPII; own estimations 
  
                                                          
3 Data are taken from Chelem (CEPII) which provides relevant data for all EU-25 countries over a long 
time period. In this database, Belgium and Luxembourg are merged in a common entity (i.e. BLEU). As usual, 
GDP are evaluated in purchasing power parities (PPPs, here based on dollars) to allow a better international 
comparability of data. Discrepancies between levels of prices across countries as well as possible under/over-
evaluation of currencies call for resort to PPPs rather than market exchange rates. See Nordhaus (2005) for a 
recent contribution on this point.  
4 See Islam (2003) for a review of empirical literature on β-convergence. See Abreu et al. (2005) for a 
meta-analysis of β convergence.  
5 At this step of the analysis, this is truly “at first glance” since, among other things, over the full period 
1960-2005, not at all EU-15 countries were members of the EU. From 1995 to May 2004, the EU was really 
composed of 15 countries. 
6 As regard Table 1, this figure fits roughly the per capita GDP of the biggest newcomer in EU in 2004, 
namely Poland. 
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Table 2 gives the estimates of unconditional β-convergence across EU-15 countries for 
different sub-periods. Interestingly, at first look, the process of deeper integration within EU 
(including the Single Market in 1993, the run-up towards EMU with related constraints for 
fulfilling Maastricht criteria in the 1990s) seems to have accelerated the speed of convergence 
across EU-15 members to 4.1 % per year over 1990-2004. But, at the second look, this 
acceleration was largely driven by the presence of Ireland in the sample. Dropping Ireland, 
the speed of convergence across EU-15 countries falls dramatically to 2 % per year over 
1990-2004, i.e. the “standard”  convergence rate. Moreover, for the recent sub-period, the 
 significativity of β is better − and the R2 is correspondingly higher − when we exclude 
Ireland from the sample. Consequently, Ireland can be viewed as an outlier in term of 
catching up. 
Whether the CEECs will follow an Irish scenario of catching up or not is then an 
important issue. Based on the estimates of convergence rate for 1990-2004, if the answer is 
“no”, the necessary time to reach 75 % of the EU-15 average for the CEECs as a whole is 24 
years while it falls to 13 years if the answer is “yes”. 
 
Table 2: Unconditional β-convergence of per capita GDP across EU-15 
 
Period 
Unconditional 
β-convergence Standard error 
Convergence 
rate λ R2 
Average EU-15 
growth rate of 
per capita GDP 
1960-2004 -1.528*** 0.230 2.5 % 0.786 2.4 
Excl. Ireland -1.349*** 0.121 2.0 % 0.917 2.4 
1960-1974 -2.930*** 0.486 3.7 % 0.751 3.8 
Excl. Ireland -3.266*** 0.333 4.3 % 0.897 3.8 
1975-1989 -1.161 0.658 1.3 % 0.205 2.2 
Excl. Ireland -1.047 0.767 1.1 % 0.144 2.2 
1990-2004 -3.148** 1.343 4.1 % 0.314 1.5 
Excl. Ireland -1.724* 0.618 2.0 % 0.414 1.4 
 
The computation of convergence rate is based on the preliminary estimation of unconditional β-convergence: ( ) ( )0 0t t tln y / y ln y Cβ= +   
where ( )0t tln y / y  denotes the annual average per capita GDP growth rate between t0 and t years and, 0ty , the 
(log of) initial per capita GDP. C is a constant term.  
 
The equation is estimated using simple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).  
The convergence rate λ is calculated from: 
( )1 1 T
T
λβ ⎛ ⎞− −= −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 where β is estimated by MCO and T denotes the number of years on which the estimation is 
running. 
In the above table, the constant term is not reported.  
(***), (**) and (*) denotes statistical significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % levels, respectively. 
 
Data sources: Chelem, CEPII; own estimations. 
 
The particular position of Ireland among Cohesion countries is clearly illustrated on 
Figure 2. This figure plots the (log of) per capita GDP in 1990 for each EU-15 country 
against its average per capita GDP growth rate over 1990-2004. While Ireland was the richest 
Cohesion countries in 1990, its per capita GDP has grown to the average rate of 5.5 % per 
year over 1990-2004 against less than 2.5 % for the other Cohesion countries (2.4 % for 
Greece and Spain, 1.7 % for Portugal). The disappointing performances of Portugal were 
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mostly concentrated over the last few years, as evidenced in Table 1. Among Cohesion 
countries, Portugal is the sole country to experiment a decrease of its per capita GDP 
(comparatively to the EU-15 or EU-25 average) since 2000. Some argue (e.g. Crespo et al., 
2004) that, over last years, Portugal has faced to more competition, especially from the export 
and FDI sides, as CEECs has entered in a process of deeper integration with EU-157. 
 
Figure 2: EU-15 countries over 1990-2004
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 Mnémoniques: IR (Ireland), SP (Spain), GR (Greece), PR (Portugal).  
 
As a result of these different economic performances, the strong reduction in cross-
section standard deviations of per capita GDP levels (or the so-called σ-convergence) has 
came to a halt in the mid-1990s, stabilizing around 0.175 since 1997 (Figure 3) 8. This 
reflects that per capita GDP levels was getting closer together over time only from 1960 to 
mid-1990s and then ceased. Again dropping Ireland from the sample, the σ-convergence goes 
on its declining trend over the last decade, meaning that all EU-15 countries, but Ireland, are 
− presumably − converging towards a common steady state9.  
For summary, the previous results cast doubt on the fact that, for a less advanced country, 
joining EU means automatically higher speed of convergence towards the more advanced 
countries. In this respect, the experience of Cohesion countries is particularly clear. Moreover, 
recall that a 2.0 % convergence rate per year was also found on samples which do not include 
only European countries (Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1991, 1992). Rather than all EU countries 
converge towards a common steady-state to a similar speed, we could have some convergence 
clubs within EU (see Fisher and Stirböck, 2004).  
 
                                                          
7 The slowdown of GDP growth in Portugal is a source of concern, giving rise to studies aiming at 
understanding the causes of its poor economic performances. See among others, Drummond (2005) and 
Constâncio (2005). While internal factors are put forward (i.e. the fall in domestic demand after the credit boom 
due to EMU membership), external factors (i.e. the competition effect from CEECs) may also explained a part of 
the story. As documented by Crespo et al. (2004), Portuguese exports bear a strong similarity to those of CEECs. 
Moreover, compared to CEECs, Portugal scores quite poorly in highly educated workforce which constitutes an 
important factor to attract foreign investors. 
8 The existence of β-convergence is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for σ-convergence. Quah 
(1993) shows that negative coefficients on β are consistent with a constant cross-section distribution. Combining 
results of β- and σ-convergence allows us to avoid potential problems associated with Galton's fallacy.  
9 Both β- and σ-convergence assume implicitly that there is a single steady-state for all countries which 
may be questionable (see next section, Box 1). 
IR 
SP 
PR 
GR 
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Figure3: σ-convergence across EU-15 countries
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 Data sources: Chelem, CEPII; own estimations. 
 
1.2. Evidence for CEECs-10 over 1995-2004 
 
To deal with the “transformational recession” of the first years of transition, all 
estimations for CEECs are now based on the 1995-2004 period. The “transformational 
recession” defines the fall of output in post socialist countries in the beginning of the 1990s. 
Altogether, the loss of traditional export markets, disruption of existing supply chains and 
decision-making structures, sudden trade liberalization and restrictive macroeconomic 
policies caused the fall in output in the first years of transition towards market economy. Then, 
growth resumed in almost CEECs in 1993/199410.  
When turning to the CEECs, there is no tendency for convergence, neither with EU-15 
countries nor within the CEECs’ group. We have even evidence of unconditional β-
divergence (β > 0) within the CEECs' group, albeit statistically insignificant (Figure 4). Put 
differently, while economic recovery gathered pace in most CEECs since 1995, the average 
GDP growth rates were very different across countries, some of them growing faster than 
others albeit their initial per capita GDP was, for instance, similar (Table 1). In this respect, 
compare the Baltic States to Bulgaria and Romania. Over the ten last years, we observe 
differentials of real GDP growth of at least 3 percentage points between the former and the 
two latter, though they were the five poorest CEECs in terms of per capita GDP in 1995 (i.e. 
less than 30 % of the average EU-25). Arguably, this divergence of per capita GDP over the 
last decade may be attributed to the process of transition itself and, consequently, may be seen 
as only a temporary phenomenon (Wagner and Hlouskova, 2002). At the same time, FDI in 
terms of levels as well as sectoral composition constitutes another good candidate (Havlik, 
2003; Hunya, 2002). Lagging behind in terms of attractiveness of FDI or receiving FDI in 
sector with low potentials of growth may explain the current divergence of per capita GDP 
within the CEECs' group as well as within the Cohesion group. 
 
                                                          
10 See for instance Havlik (2005) on that point. 
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Figure 4: CEECs-10 over 1995-2004
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        Data sources: Chelem, CEPII; own estimations. 
 
1.3. Domestic investment versus foreign investment as a key determinant of GDP 
convergence  
 
According to neoclassical models (e.g. Solow, 1956), the investment rate is a key 
determinant of growth and convergence across countries 11 . Both public and private 
investments contribute to growth. According to Hlouskova and Wagner (2002), an increase of 
1 % point of investment in GDP accounts for an increase of 0.04 % point of per capita GDP 
for EU-15 countries over 1960-1998 after controlling for other factors (population growth, 
initial per capita GDP etc.). But, no similar positive relation between per capita GDP growth 
rate and GFCF as a share of GDP holds for a sample including CEECs and Cohesion 
countries, as evidenced in Figure 5. By contrast, FDI has a positive and significant impact − 
at the 8 % level − on per capita GDP growth rate: a 1 % point increase of FDI inflows in GDP 
accounts for an increase of 0.3 % point of per capita GDP growth on a sample including 
CEECs and Cohesion countries (Figure 6 and Table 3) 12. As FDI contributes to GFCF the 
extent to which it does not consist in acquisition of existing assets, we have deduced 
brownfield FDI (proxy by the sales of existing companies to foreign investors) from FDI 
inflows to obtain a measure of greenfield FDI13. In that case, FDI has a larger positive and 
significant impact − at the 3 % level − on per capita GDP growth rate: a 1 % point increase of 
FDI inflows in GDP accounts for an increase of 0.42 % point of per capita GDP growth 
(Figure 7 and Table 3). 
It follows that by providing “fresh cash” for financing investment, FDI boosts the GDP 
growth of host economy. Alongside “fresh cash”, FDI may also have other positive impact on 
                                                          
11 See Box 1 for an overview on theoretical developments of growth and convergence literature. 
12 Malta and Cyprus which are other lagging behind EU-25 countries in terms of per capita GDP are 
excluded from our sample, as some of their FDI are off-shore activities.  
13 Greenfield FDI defines a newly created unit of production in a host economy by a foreign investor while 
brownfield FDI consists in the acquisition of an existing unit of production. Due to privatisation process of state-
owned enterprises, brownfield FDI accounted for sizeable amount of total FDI inflows in CEECs. Nevertheless, 
using our measure based on sales of enterprises to foreign investors, the share of brownfield investment in 
CEECs stands between 18 % (Estonia and Lithuania) and 55 % (Bulgaria) in average over 1995-2004, with large 
differences across years related to the timing of privatisation. These figures are quite small, with respect to the 
widespread view that brownfield FDI are predominant in CEECs. Comparatively to the 1995-1999 period, the 
share of greenfield FDI has increased in Bulgaria, Romania and to a lesser extent in Estonia to reach respectively 
60 %, 75 % and 90 % in Estonia over 2000-2004. 
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host economy even when FDI takes the form of brownfield investment. Multinational 
corporations (MNCs) adopt generally more up-to-date technologies than domestic firms14. 
Then, technological spillovers may occur from foreign firms to domestic ones operating 
within the same sector through imitation of productive process, products, management. Other 
positive externalities arise from forward/backward linkages (i.e. between user and customer 
firms) or through labour turnover from firms under foreign control to those under domestic 
control. At the same time, negative effects (e.g. market stealing) cannot be excluded. 
 
BOX 1 − Key theoretical developments on growth and convergence literature: 
from neoclassical to “new growth” determinants 
 
 The theoretical literature on growth and convergence across countries evolved considerably in the 
1980s and again in the 1990s. A key explanatory factor for that is the empirical observation that very low 
income countries never appear to converge towards the high income countries, while only middle income 
countries succeed in catching-up high income countries (see references in Ben-David, 1995). Such an 
empirical finding in the 1980s began to raise doubts about the plausibility of global convergence 
altogether, as resulting from neoclassical models(1). This was followed by a large number of “new 
growth” models that endogenized technological progress and predicted very different outcomes 
concerning the behaviour of income differentials over time. Especially, in the 1980s, emphasis was put on 
the importance of technological spillovers across countries as a key explanation of convergence across 
countries and, in the 1990s, on the necessary conditions to absorb those spillovers. In what follows, we 
present briefly the theoretical developments from neoclassical models to new growth models. By this 
way, we will put in a better perspective our own basic estimates and our brief overview of other empirical 
works. 
Following the seminal work of Solow (1956), the theoretical literature on growth was typically 
based on neoclassical models until the 1970s. This kind of models explains growth with accumulation of 
labour, capital, and other production factors with diminishing returns to scale. In these models, the 
economy converges towards a steady state equilibrium where the level of per capita income is determined 
by savings and investment, depreciation, and population growth, but there is no permanent income 
growth. Any observed per capita income growth occurs because the economy is still converging towards 
its steady state, or because it is in transition from one steady state to another. The policy implications are 
then straightforward: increases in savings and investment as well as reductions in the population growth 
rate shift the economy to a higher steady state income level.  
The importance of technical progress was also recognized in the neoclassical growth models (Solow, 
1956, 1957), but the determinants of the technological level were not discussed in detail. Instead, 
technology was seen as an exogenous factor. Yet, it was clear that convergence in per capita income 
levels could not occur unless technologies converged as well. As already mentioned, faced to the absence 
of global convergence at the empirical level, growth research has therefore increasingly focused on 
understanding and endogenizing technical progress in the 1980s and onwards. Contrasting with 
neoclassical models, almost “new growth” models assume constant or increasing returns of reproductible 
factors as a result of knowledge accumulation. Since knowledge has generally a nature of public good in 
these models, all investments in knowledge creation (R&D, education, training, etc.) generate 
externalities that prevent diminishing returns to scale for labour and physical capital. Taking this into 
account, an economy may experience positive long-run growth instead of the neoclassical steady state 
where per capita incomes remain unchanged. Yet, one characteristic of many such models is the 
prediction that countries will converge to multiple equilibria rather than to a single target. 
Depending on the economy's starting point, technical progress and growth can be based on creation 
of entirely new knowledge, or adaptation and transfer of existing foreign technology. Since it is less 
costly to learn to use existing technology than to generate new technology, less advanced countries have 
the potential to grow faster than the more advanced economies for any given level of investment or R&D 
spending. However, this potential for convergence is conditional among other things on the economy's 
                                                          
14“Technologies” must be understood here in a broad sense, including machines, process of production, 
management and so on. 
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level of human capital. Consequently, improvements in education and human capital are viewed as 
essential for absorbing and adapting foreign technology, and to generate sustainable long-run growth. 
Adaptation and transfer of existing foreign technology necessitates some kind of international 
“openness”. While exports and imports are viewed as an important vehicle for international technology 
transfer especially in the 1980s, FDI are increasingly judged preferable in the 1990s for a higher and 
faster acquisition of up-to-date foreign technology in the host economy. As put forward by Blomström 
and Kokko (2003), multinational corporations (MNCs) undertake a major part of the world's private R&D 
efforts, producing own and controlling most of the world's advanced technology. When a MNC sets up a 
foreign affiliate, the affiliate receives some amount of the proprietary technology that constitutes the 
parent's firm-specific advantage and allows it to compete successfully with local firms that have superior 
knowledge of local markets, consumer preferences, and business practices. Even if the establishment of a 
foreign affiliate is almost per definition a decision to internalize the use of core technology, this leads to a 
geographical diffusion of technology beyond the boundaries of the MNC. Positive technological 
spillovers occur for local firms within the same sector through imitation of productive process and 
products. Moreover, MNC technology leaks to the surrounding economy through forward and backward 
linkages, as MNCs provide training and technical assistance to their local suppliers, subcontractors and 
customers. The labour market is another important channel for spillovers, as almost all MNCs train 
operatives and managers who may subsequently take employment in local firms or establish entirely new 
companies. By this way, FDI may be a particularly valuable source of new technology: while it 
introduces new ideas, it also strengthens the human capital base needed to adapt these ideas to the local 
market. At the same time, a minimum level of human capital is needed in the host country for allowing 
local firms to absorb the potential spillovers benefits while it determines also how much FDI the country 
can attract. Thus, it is likely that the relationship between FDI and human capital is highly non-linear and 
that multiple equilibria are possible (Blomström and Kokko, 2003).  
Alongside “human capabilities”, “financial capacities” of the host economy are another key 
determinants to fully exploit the positive spillovers from FDI (Alfaro and al., 2003). A low level of 
financial development in the host economy acts as an impediment to start a new business, to externally 
finance the adoption of up-to-date technologies etc. 
Note: (1) In the previous section, none EU-15 incumbent belongs to the group of low income 
countries. As a result, we find evidence of β-convergence or, put differently, of “localized” convergence. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Relationship between GFCF as a share of GDP and per 
capita GDP growth rate (1995-2004)
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Figure 6: Relationship between FDI inflows as a share of GDP 
and per capita GDP growth (average 1995-2004, in %) 
y = 0,2839x + 2,567
R2 = 0,2363
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Figure 7: Relationship between greenfield FDI inflows as a share 
of GDP and per capita GDP growth rate
y = 0,4148x + 2,6791
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Table 3: Summary of basic estimates for Figures 5-7 
 
Independent variables Coefficient b 
(t- stat) 
Constant 
(t-stat) 
R2 
GFCF in % of GDP 0.007 3.754 0.000 
 (0.04) (1.14)  
FDI inflows in % of GDP 0.284* 2.567*** 0.236 
 (1.92) (3.178)  
Greenfield FDI inflows in % of GDP 0.414** 2.679*** 0.333 
 (2.44) (4.25)  
 
In all estimates, the dependent variable is the average per capita GDP growth of the country over 1995-2004. 
Independent variables, also taken in average over the period, are reported in the first column left hand side and 
tested one by one. Formally, we estimate the following equation using simple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS):  ( )0t t tln y / y bX C= +  
where ( )0t tln y / y  denotes the annual average per capita GDP growth rate over t0 and t years and, tX , the annual 
average of independent variable over t0 and t years. C is a constant term.  
The country sample includes the CEECs-10 and the Cohesion countries. 
 
 (***), (**) and (*) denotes statistical significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % levels, respectively. 
 
Data sources: Chelem, CEPII; OECD; Cnuced; Eurostat; own estimations. 
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2. A comparative overview of CEECs and Cohesion countries 
 
2.1. Preliminary remarks 
Due to data limitations at the sectoral level, most of this descriptive part is based on four 
CEECs (hereafter, CEECs-4), namely the Czech republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, 
which account together for more than 90 % of new EU members absolute GDP and also 86 % 
of new EU inhabitants (Table A1 in the Appendix). They are compared to Cohesion countries, 
with a particular focus on Ireland versus Portugal15. 
 
 
2.2. Productivity: how do they stand? 
 
Main stylised facts are as follows. 
First, the CEECs as a whole are very lagging behind the average EU-15 in terms of 
labour productivity. Measured at PPPs, the average level of labour productivity at the macro-
level reached just 52 % of the EU-15 average (Havlik, 2005). Thus, a worker in CEECs 
produces roughly half of goods and services produced by a EU-15 worker. 
Compared to Ireland, the differentials of labour productivity at the macro-level are even 
larger (Table 4). The GDP per hour worked stands between 27 % (in Latvia) and 53 % (in 
Slovenia) of the Irish one. As soon as we consider the CEECs-4, their GDP per hour worked 
do not exceed 46 % when Ireland is taken as a comparator. These figures put CEECs far away 
from Spain (79 % of GDP per hour worked with respect to Ireland) while, compared to 
Cohesion countries, their labour productivity gap is the lowest with respect to Portugal. 
Considering the CEECs-4, their GDP per hour worked stands between 77 % (in Poland) and 
91 % (in Hungary) of the Portuguese, as reported in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: GDP per hour worked (2003)
UE-15 = 100 Irlande = 100 Portugal = 100
Czech republic 47 40 80
Estonia 36 31 62
Latvia 31 27 54
Lithuania 39 34 67
Hungary 53 46 91
Poland 44 39 77
Slovenia 61 53 104
Slovakia 52 45 89
Greece 69 60 118
Spain 90 79 156
Ireland 115 100 199
Portugal 58 50 100  
    Source: Eurostat, except for Hungary (OECD). 
 
                                                          
15 A comparison with Portugal rather than Greece as the less advanced among Cohesion countries has a 
twofold motivation. First, growth marked the pace in Portugal over the last few years as previously mentioned. 
Second, very large tourism activities in Greece do not make that country a good comparator for CEECs, as soon 
as we are interested in issues of catching up. 
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Second, differentials of labour productivity per worker are much more pronounced in 
manufacturing sectors than in market services sectors (Table 4)16. In 2002, manufacturing 
labour productivity of CEECs-4 as well as of Portugal does not reach 25 % of the Irish one. 
Correspondent figures are respectively around 30 and 40 % for Greece and Spain. The Irish 
lead in manufacturing sector contributes largely to its lead at the macro-level, especially with 
respect to Spain and Greece. Indeed, Ireland is no longer a leader in terms of market services 
labour productivity with respect tothese two countries. Compared to remaining countries, 
Ireland appears still as a leader in market services sector, but at a lesser extent than in 
manufacturing sectors: market services labour productivity stands between 60 % (in the 
Czech republic) and near 74 % (in Portugal) of the Irish one. 
 
Table 5: Labour productivity by sectors in CEECs-4 and Cohesion countries  
(2002, Ireland = 100) 
 
Manufacturing Construction Market services**
Poland 33 20 61 63 38
Czceh republic 45 21 46 59 46
Slovakia 46 21 50 67 47
Hungary 47 23 51 69 51
Ireland 100 100 100 100 100
Spain 80 40 92 113 83
Portugal 48 24 55 74 54
Greece 67 29 104 104 74
2002, Ireland =100, value added at current prices and PPPs per person employed.
* Including Agriculture, hunting, forestry & fishing; Electricity, gas & water. 
**Market services: Exclusion of community, social and personal services.
*** Including Commnunity, social and personal services.
Source : STAN database; own computations.
Of which:
Total market economy* Total***
 
 
 
Third, Poland has a clear lag over other CEECs-4 in terms of labour productivity. Its VA 
per worker at the level of total market economy reaches only 33 % of the one of Ireland 
against between 45 and 47 % for Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech republic (Table 5) 17. 
Considering very broad sectors, Poland appears as a leader in only construction compared to 
other CEECs-4. 
Focusing on manufacturing sectors as in Table 6, the lags of Poland with respect to other 
CEECs-4 tend to be concentrated in sectors of medium/high technology, generally intensive 
in capital and/or skilled labour and/or R&D (as transport equipment, chemical, machinery). 
Its leads are rather in sectors of low technology and unskilled labour (as wood, pulp and paper 
products). Lags of Poland − and also its leads − are in general the greater with respect to 
Hungary, and to a lesser extent, with respect to Slovakia. Note that Poland tends to be lagging 
behind the Czech republic also in sectors intensive in unskilled labour (as food and textile 
                                                          
16 Computations of productivity based on hour worked constitute a better measure than those per worker. 
Unfortunately, data of hour worked are not available at the sectoral level. Moreover, we are aware that 
productivity in sector of services gives rise to huge difficulties. Problems arise especially from the difficulty to 
evaluate production in those sectors. See Appendix: Description on the STAN database. 
17 We consider here only the market economy to drop differentials of productivity across countries due to 
differences of public sector size. Since efficiency in public services is not a goal per se, considering community 
and social services may then result in a wrong picture of differential of productivity across countries.  
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products). Compared to other CEECs-4, Poland exhibits thus disappointing labour 
productivities in almost manufacturing sectors. The sole exception is in the sector of electric 
and optical equipment. Similar remarks hold also with respect to Portugal. Poland is a leader 
with respect to Portugal in only electric and optical equipment − and, to a lesser extent in pulp 
and paper products − while its highest lag is found in transport equipment, as with respect to 
Hungary, the Czech republic and Slovakia. 
As a general feature, Hungary shows strong leads in sectors of medium/high technology 
(especially, transport equipment but also machinery, electrical and optical equipment) as well 
as petroleum products. By contrast, all the lags of Hungary are concentrated in sectors of low 
technology, intensive in unskilled labour. Hungarian leads and lags are found large with 
respect to other CEECs-4 and as well as Portugal. The sole exception is the sector of 
machinery where Hungary is lagging behind Portugal. 
The Czech republic is a leader in sector of low technology with respect Poland and 
Hungary (as already mentioned) but also with respect Slovakia. Especially, the Czech 
republic shows higher productivity in food, textiles, leather and recycling (compared to other 
CEECs-4) as well as in wood and pulp products (compared to Hungary and Poland). Non 
negligible leads are also found for the Czech republic in sector of medium/high technology 
(i.e. in machinery, electrical and optical equipment with respect Slovakia; in transport with 
respect Poland; in chemicals, with respect Hungary). However, the Czech republic is better 
characterised by leads in sectors of low technology, as soon as comparator countries are the 
other CEECs-4. Note also that, in low technology sector, the Czech republic is more advanced 
than other CEECs-4 in terms of productivity catching up towards Portugal. The latter is even 
lagging behind the Czech republic in food products.  
As well-known and documented, the major lead of Slovakia is in transport equipment, 
but with respect Hungary. To the great exception of this sector, Slovakia exhibits only few 
leads with respect other CEECs-4 and Portugal. Its manufacturing sector would be very 
lagging behind the one of other CEECs-4 in terms of labour productivity while it accounts for 
a large share of total gross output (see next section). That means that services sector would be 
the main source of per capita GDP growth in Slovakia, as evidenced by the Slovak lead over 
other CEECs-4 in financial intermediation or transport and telecommunications.  
Finally, Portugal is a leader in almost sectors with respect CEECs-4, and its leads tend to 
be the highest in sectors of low technology. That puts potentially Portugal on a different 
growth path than CEECs-4, since these sectors have low potentials for productivity growth. 
The Hungarian manufacturing sector is mainly oriented towards medium/high technology 
sectors (e.g. transport equipment, electrical and optical equipment) in which high productivity 
growth may be expected. The Czech republic is currently closing the productivity gap with 
Portugal in sectors of low technology while developing some sectors of medium/high 
technology. At present, Poland shows a higher labour productivity in electrical and optical 
sectors than other CEECs-4 as well as Portugal. The Slovak case is more puzzling due to the 
absence of leads in manufacturing sector contrasting with the presence of leads in services 
sectors. 
Fourth, as reported in Table 7, the labour productivity growth was higher in CEECs-4 
than in Portugal over 1995-200018. Labour productivity growth stood between 4.2 % (in 
Hungary) and 6.8 % (in Poland) for the CEECs-4 against 3.2 % for Portugal in the 
manufacturing sector. Labour productivity improvements were particularly strong in sectors 
like transport equipment with an average of 10 % per year for Poland, Hungary and Portugal 
                                                          
18 2000 year is the latest year for which sectoral data are available for Poland. 
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and, even 22 % and 27.5 % for respectively the Czech republic and Slovakia. In other sectors 
of medium/high technology where either all or some CEECs-4 have shown large labour 
productivity growth (chemicals, machinery, electronical and optical equipment), it is worth 
nothing that Portugal have reported negative growth rate of productivity (in chemicals and, 
especially, in electrical and optical equipment). No similar development was observed in 
Greece and Spain while Irish labour productivity have decreased in machinery and equipment 
and, especially, in rubber and plastics products over 1995-2002. These decreases were largely 
compensated by labour productivity improvements in other sectors, particularly in the sector 
of chemicals which contributes largely to the economic performances of the “Celtic Tiger”19. 
                                                          
19 See Barry (2003) for the Irish economic development over the last three decades. Interestingly, chemicals 
already displayed a revealed comparative advantage at the time of EU entry (i.e. in 1973), as a result of a 
favourable law on foreign ownership of companies and a zero tax rate on profits derived from manufactured 
exports implemented in the 1960s.  
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Table 5: Manufacturing and market services labour productivity by industries in CEECs-4 and Cohesion countries 
(2002, Ireland = 100) 
Poland* Hungary Czech rep. Slovakia** Portugal Greece Spain Ireland
Technology Factor(s)
Food products, Beverages & Tobacco 34 29 30 28 36 37 50 100 Low Labour
Textiles & Textile products 49 43 55 38 74 92 108 100 Low Labour
Leather & Footwear 51 20 32 68 48 63 59 100 Low Labour
Wood & Wood Products & Cork 67 32 42 54 63 44 66 100 Low Labour
Pulp, Paper, Paper Products, Printing & Publishing 29 28 29 37 45 38 46 100 Low Labour
Coke, Petroleum products & Nuclear fuel .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Medium/low
Chemicals &Chemical products 10 11 11 11 9 11 16 100 Medium/high R&D
Rubber & Plastics Products 82 71 63 75 77 97 147 100 Medium/low labour
Other non-metallic mineral products 52 73 55 53 75 115 110 100 Medium/low 
Basic metals & Fabricated Metal products 71 61 75 82 73 96 137 100 Medium/low Labour
Machinery & Equipment NEC 57 74 61 50 73 64 121 100 Medium/high
Electrical & Optical equipment 31 32 26 20 31 52 59 100 Medium/high tech R&D
Transport equipment 69 148 121 122 157 167 168 100 Medium/high R&D/capital
Manufacturing N.E.C; Recycling 36 33 43 43 52 63 74 100 Low
Knowledge intensity
Wholesale & Retail trade 91 60 57 59 71 93 87 100 Low
Restaurants & Hotels 79 57 67 49 69 187 245 100 Low
Transport & Storage & Communication 50 60 80 80 127 111 141 100 Low/medium
Financial intermediation 41 78 71 74 118 129 162 100 Medium/high
Real estate & Business services 48 79 40 48 53 97 83 100 Medium/high
* 2000;**2001; 2002 for other countries.
Technological classification of manufacturing industries is based on the Eurostat/OECD classification.
Knowledge classification of market services is based on Eurostat classification.
Source : STAN database; own computations.
Total manufacturing
Technological, factor and knowledge intensity
Services
 
 
 
 
 
Sandrine Levasseur 
 17
 
 
Table 6: Leads/lags between CEECs-4 and Portugal 
 
Leader (or lagger) country
Reference country Hungary Czech rep. Slovakia Portugal Poland Czech rep. Slovakia Portugal
Technology Factor(s)
Food products, Beverages & Tobacco 7% -26% -24% -22% -7% -31% -29% -27% Low Labour
Textiles & Textile products 15% -15% 9% -29% -13% -26% -5% -38% Low Labour
Leather & Footwear 41% -3% 6% -39% -29% -31% -24% -57% Low Labour
Wood & Wood Products & Cork 50% 21% 59% -17% -33% -19% 6% -45% Low Labour
Pulp, Paper, Paper Products, Printing & Publishing 24% 0% 29% -37% -20% -20% 3% -50% Low Labour
Coke, Petroleum products & Nuclear fuel -61% 17% -16% -54% 158% 201% 117% 17% Medium/low
Chemicals &Chemical products -11% -27% -5% -26% 12% -18% 6% -17% Medium/high R&D
Rubber & Plastics Products 26% -3% -11% 2% -20% -23% -29% -19% Medium/low labour
Other non-metallic mineral products -24% -21% 13% -29% 32% 3% 49% -6% Medium/low 
Basic metals & Fabricated Metal products -3% 1% 13% -1% 3% 5% 17% 3% Medium/low Labour
Machinery & Equipment NEC -14% -7% 59% -26% 17% 9% 86% -14% Medium/high
Electrical & Optical equipment -2% 25% 112% 13% 2% 28% 118% 16% Medium/high tech R&D
Transport equipment -60% -38% -53% -50% 152% 56% 19% 27% Medium/high R&D/capital
Manufacturing N.E.C; Recycling 50% -6% 15% -16% -33% -37% -24% -44% Low
Wholesale & Retail trade 57% 30% 22% 9% -36% -17% -22% -30% Low
Restaurants & Hotels 43% 11% 18% 8% -30% -23% -18% -25% Low
Transport & Storage & Communication -1% -22% -15% -56% 1% -21% -14% -55% Low/medium
Financial intermediation -40% -38% -46% -69% 67% 3% -10% -49% Medium high
Real estate & Business services -43% 13% -13% -17% 74% 97% 52% 45% Medium/high
*Leads (or lags) are computed as the differential of productivity between leader (or lagger) country and reference country, and expressed in % of the productivity of reference country.
Poland Hungary
Leads if positive sign (lags if negative sign) in %*
Total manufacturing
Services
Technology, factor and knowledge intensity
Knowledge intensity
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Table 6: …/… (continued) 
 
Leader (or lagger) country
Reference country Poland Hungary Slovakia Portugal Poland Hungary Czech rep. Portugal
Food products, Beverages & Tobacco 36% 46% 4% 6% 31% 40% -4% 2% Low Labour
Textiles & Textile products 17% 35% 28% -17% -8% 6% -22% -35% Low Labour
Leather & Footwear 4% 46% 10% -37% -6% 32% -9% -43% Low Labour
Wood & Wood Products & Cork -17% 24% 32% -31% -37% -6% -24% -48% Low Labour
Pulp, Paper, Paper Products, Printing & Publishing 0% 25% 29% -37% -22% -3% -23% -51% Low
Coke, Petroleum products & Nuclear fuel -14% -67% -28% -61% 19% -54% 39% -46% Medium/low
Chemicals &Chemical products 37% 22% 30% 1% 5% -6% -23% -22% Medium/high R&D
Rubber & Plastics Products 3% 30% -8% 5% 12% 41% 8% 14% Medium/low labour
Other non-metallic mineral products 27% -3% 44% -9% -12% -33% -31% -37% Medium/low 
Basic metals & Fabricated Metal products -1% -4% 12% -2% -12% -15% -11% -12% Medium/low Labour
Machinery & Equipment NEC 8% -8% 71% -21% -37% -46% -42% -54% Medium/high
Electrical & Optical equipment -20% -22% 70% -9% -53% -54% -41% -47% Medium/high tech R&D
Transport equipment 61% -36% -23% -19% 111% -16% 31% 6% Medium/high R&D/capital
Manufacturing N.E.C; Recycling 6% 60% 22% -10% -13% 31% -18% -26% Low
Wholesale & Retail trade -23% 21% -6% -16% -18% 28% 6% -11% Low
Restaurants & Hotels -10% 29% 6% -2% -15% 22% -6% -8% Low
Transport & Storage & Communication 28% 27% 9% -43% 18% 17% -8% -48% Low/medium
Financial intermediation 62% -3% -13% -50% 86% 12% 15% -43% Medium/high
Real estate & Business services -12% -49% -23% -27% 14% -34% 29% -5% Medium/high
*Leads (or lags) are computed as the differential of productivity between leader (or lagger) country and reference country, and expressed in % of the productivity of reference country.
Leads if positive sign (lags if negative sign) in %*
Slovakia
Knowledge intensity
Technology, factor and knowledge intensity
Technology Factor(s)
Czech republic
Total manufacturing
Services
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Table 7: Labour productivity growth in CEECs-4 and Cohesion countries 
 
Pologne Hungary Czech rep Slovakia Portugal Greece Spain Ireland Technological, factor and knowledge intensity
Total manufacturing 6.8 4.2 6,0 4.5 3.2 4,0 1.3 8.5 Technology Factor(s)
Food products, Beverages & Tobacco 6.7 4.3 9,0 11.1 4.5 1,0 1.2 0.6 Low Labour
Textiles & Textile products 4.6 3.0 6.9 5.6 1.8 -0.6 0.9 6.1 Low Labour
Leather & Footwear 6.4 -0.2 5.1 18.9 3.6 2.9 0.6 1.4 Low Labour
Wood & Wood Products & Cork 8.8 1.4 7.7 0.6 5.5 1,0 0.9 2.2 Low Labour
Pulp, Paper, Paper Products, Printing & Publishing 3.5 6.7 8.5 0.7 2.6 5.6 1.4 13.2 Low Labour
Coke, Petroleum products & Nuclear fuel 11.5 -0.2 14.2 -2.2 19.8 33.4 10.3 .. Medium/low 
Chemicals &Chemical products 5.3 10.2 10.1 4.3 -0.2 0.5 1.9 15.5 Medium/high R&D
Rubber & Plastics Products 2.9 3.3 15.0 9.1 1.4 2.3 0.9 -2.7 Medium/low Labour
Other non-metallic mineral products 10.4 4.1 8.5 7.6 2.6 9.9 1.5 3.7 Medium/low 
Basic metals & Fabricated Metal products 4,0 1.8 -0.4 1.1 2.2 6.3 0.4 1.9 Medium/low Labour
Machinery & Equipment NEC 7.5 9.6 4.3 3.1 4.9 4,0 1.9 -0.9 Medium/high
Electrical & Optical equipment 9.7 6.2 9,0 7.5 -1.9 5.8 1.1 4.8 Medium/high R&D
Transport equipment 10.0 9.5 21.7 27.5 10.5 7.5 1.5 7.5 Medium/high R&D/capital
Manufacturing N.E.C; Recycling 5.5 -0.4 4.3 7.7 4.4 2.8 2.8 3.4 Low Labour  
Source: STAN database, own computations using current value added and PPPs per person employed. 
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2.3. Industrialisation versus tertiarisation process 
 
As soon as productive structures are measured by production data rather than 
employment data, CEECs-4 and Cohesion countries as well as other EU-15 exhibits a 
common trend of “de-agrarianization”, meaning that the importance of agriculture in the 
economy declines over the time (Table 8)20. Currently, in our country sample, the share of 
primary sector in total value added (VA) stands between 3 % (in Ireland) and 7 % (in Greece) 
while the EU-15 average is 2 %. That puts CEECs-4 not to far from the EU-15 average, 
contrasting with two-digits figures of early 1990s in Hungary, Poland and the Czech republic 
as a leg of the socialist period. The size of agriculture was always limited in Slovakia, even 
under the regime of planned economy. More than other former socialist countries, Slovakia 
was strongly specialized in heavy manufacturing. Consequently, with the fall of Berlin wall 
and the transition towards market economy, CEECs entered in a “de-industrialization” 
process until 1995, except Slovakia in which the share of manufacturing in total economy 
measured by either VA or gross output increased. Concomitantly, CEECs entered in a 
“tertiarization” process due to the necessity to provide all services that play an important role 
in market economy21. As a general feature, business sector services show an increasing trend 
in CEECs throughout the period.  
However, it is worth noting that countries like the Czech republic and Hungary are also 
embarking in a process of “re-industrialisation” since 1995, particularly perceptible if we 
look at the share of manufacturing in gross output. By contrast, a process of tertiarization 
would better describe Poland, as evidenced by the growing importance of services in total 
economy and the fall of manufacturing in either VA or gross output. As a result, 
manufacturing sector accounts currently for 18 % of VA − and 29 % of gross output − in 
Poland which are very similar to figures found for Portugal (17 % and 28 % respectively). By 
contrast, Hungary and the Czech republic are reporting a higher degree of industrialisation 
than both Poland, Portugal, Greece and Spain. Finally, the Czech republic, Hungary and to a 
lesser extent, Slovakia, appear close to Ireland rather than to Portugal in terms of the 
importance of manufacturing sector in total economy, as evidenced in Table 8. Currently, the 
share of manufacturing accounts for 31 % of VA in Ireland, 26 % in the Czech republic and 
22 % in Hungary. It is worth mentioning that a similar path of “re-industrialisation” is 
observed for Ireland since early 1990s, contrasting in this respect with all other EU-15 
countries. Some argue (e.g. Havlik, 2005) that Slovakia may also follow a process of “re-
industrialisation” in the very future while others (e.g. IMF, 2005) detect already signs of such 
“re-industrialisation” towards light industry. That would divide the enlarged EU in two 
country groups: one group with an industrialized economy growing fast as soon as 
industrialization occurs in sectors with high potentials of productivity growth; and another 
group with a tertiarised economy growing slowly due to a low potential for productivity 
growth in almost services.  
 
 
  
                                                          
20 When measured by employment data, the share of agriculture sector shows a increasing trend in Poland 
and Romania throughout the period. 
21 Under the previous regime, industry was emphasized at the expense of services which were considered as 
“unproductive labour”. Anyway, many modern services were simply not needed under socialism.  
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Table 8: Sectoral composition of the economy in four CEECs and Cohesion countries  
(in % of VA and total gross output) 
 
1991 1995 2003 1991 1995 2003
Czech republic Primary sector 9 7 4 10 6 3
Manufacturing 26 23 26 42 35 39
Electricity and construction 16 14 11 17 17 14
Services 50 55 59 32 41 43
of which  Business sector services 36 40 43 24 31 33
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Hungary Primary sector 12 7 4 13 9 5
Manufacturing 21 23 22 35 33 39
Electricity and construction 9 8 8 11 9 9
Services 57 62 66 41 49 47
of which  Business sector services 39 42 42 29 34 33
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Slovakia* Primary sector 7 7 5 8 7 5
Manufacturing 20 27 21 33 38 35
Electricity and construction 14 10 10 16 14 14
Services 59 56 64 42 42 46
of which  Business sector services 43 42 46 31 32 35
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Poland** Primary sector 10 11 5 12 11 6
Manufacturing 27 23 18 32 34 29
Electricity and construction 12 11 11 13 12 12
Services 51 56 66 43 43 53
of which  Business sector services 27 36 46 27 30 40
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Spain Primary sector 6 5 4 .. 5 4
Manufacturing 20 19 16 .. 32 32
Electricity and construction 12 10 12 .. 12 12
Services 62 66 68 .. 51 51
of which  Business sector services 43 45 48 .. 36 37
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Portugal Primary sector 7 5 4 5 4 3
Manufacturing 20 20 17 35 33 28
Electricity and construction 9 10 9 12 13 13
Services 64 65 70 48 50 56
of which  Business sector services 44 42 43 34 35 38
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Ireland Primary sector 9 8 3 .. .. ..
Manufacturing 27 30 31 .. .. ..
Electricity and construction 8 7 9 .. .. ..
Services 56 54 56 .. .. ..
of which  Business sector services 36 34 39 .. .. ..
Total 100 100 100 .. .. ..
Greece Primary sector 12 10 7 .. 9 6
Manufacturing 15 13 11 .. 24 20
Electricity and construction 10 9 10 .. 10 12
Services 63 68 71 .. 57 61
of which  Business sector services 45 48 50 .. 41 44
Total 100 100 100 .. 100 100
*For Slovakia, 1993 instead 1991. ** For Poland, 1992 and 2002, instead of, respectively,1991 and 2003.
Source : STAN database, own computations.
SectorsCountry
Share in VA Share in gross output
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2.4. FDI  
 
2.4.1. How sizable they are for the host economies? 
As formerly socialist economies, CEECs opened only recently to foreign investors. 
Almost began to liberalize their long term capital flows around 1995, except Hungary and 
Slovenia. Hungary opened up its economy to foreign investors ahead while Slovenia 
maintained until few years ago restrictions on FDI. Ireland followed a FDI-friendly policy as 
soon as the 1960s22 while FDI inflows became perceptible in Spain and Portugal with EU 
membership in mid-1980s. However, even in Cohesion countries, the bulk of FDI inflows was 
made over the fifteen last years in the context of worldwide FDI. 
CEECs and Cohesion countries have received individually very different amounts of FDI 
over the last decade, as evidenced by the share of inward stock in GDP or per capita (Table 9). 
Considering the CEECs, the inward stock of FDI to GDP stands between 15 % (for Slovenia) 
and 85 % (for Estonia) in 2004, with an average of 36 % for the group. Within the CEECs-4, 
it is worth noting the corresponding figures are respectively 60 % and 52.5 % for Hungary 
and the Czech republic contrasting with those of 35 % and 25 % for respectively Slovakia and 
Poland. 
For a long time, due to an earlier liberalization, Hungary concentrated large amounts of 
FDI directed towards CEECs, both in terms of GDP and per capita. Then, in the corner of the 
new millennium, Estonia became “first” among the CEECs' group, going on attracting FDI in 
a sustained way since. Over the last years, some countries which were lagging behind in terms 
of FDI has experienced a boom in their inflows. Especially, FDI is better characterised as a 
recent phenomenon in countries like Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia. These three latter 
countries received together 25 % of FDI inflows directed towards CEECs over 2000-2004, 
against 12 % over 1995-1999. In 2004, Slovenia remains a clear outlier, as a result of its FDI-
aversive policy in the 1990s. 
Despite the entry of CEECs as host countries of FDI, Cohesion countries continued to 
attract FDI, even if a “diverting effect” cannot be excluded when comparing FDI over 1995-
1999 versus 2000-2004 (Table 9). In fact, during the worldwide boom of FDI, beginning in 
1995 for dying out in 2000, Cohesion countries received less FDI relative to CEECs than 
during the more recent period of slowdown in FDI. Particularly astonishing was FDI made in 
Ireland over the ten last years, such as currently, the FDI inward stock accounts for 125 % of 
its GDP. Only Greece did not succeed in attracting large amount of FDI. In 2004, inward 
stock represented only 13 % of its GDP which constitutes the lowest figure in our sample. 
Corresponding figures are respectively 33 % and 37 % for Spain and Portugal. That puts 
roughly Slovakia in the same rank than Spain and Portugal, but Poland behind these two 
Cohesion countries by 10 percent points 23 . By contrast, the Czech republic and, more 
importantly, Hungary are well above Spain, Portugal and Slovakia, by roughly 17 and 25 
percent point respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
22 See Barry (2003) for instance on FDI policy in an historical perspective. 
23 Poland is also behind the EU-15 average by 10 percent point. In 2003, inward FDI stock amounted to 
33 % in the EU-15.  
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Table 9: FDI in CEECs and Cohesion countries 
1995 2000 2003 1995 2000 2004 1995-2004 1995-1999 2000-2004
Greece 1120 1266 2452 9 12 13 5 5 4
Ireland 13984 34701 56191 73 134 124 72 44 92
Portugal 1964 3315 6246 18 27 37 17 11 21
 Spain 2887 4377 8129 18 28 33 117 77 146
Cyprus 472 4838 9847 4 33 53 4 3 5
Malta 2216 6499 8897 17 67 67 2 2 1
Czech Republic 830 2642 5515 13 39 52 22 20 24
Estonia 579 2329 7138 19 51 85 2 2 3
Hungary 1288 2687 5959 25 49 60 19 25 15
Latvia 380 988 1938 14 29 32 2 2 2
Lithuania 194 766 1855 6 21 28 2 3 2
Poland 297 1068 1593 6 21 24 30 35 27
Slovakia 232 895 2685 4 18 35 6 3 9
Slovenia 1038 1323 2522 10 15 15 2 1 3
Bulgaria 67 347 973 3 18 31 5 3 7
Romania 49 347 826 2 18 25 8 6 10
      CEECs .. .. .. .. 26 36 100 100 100
Source : CNUCED; own computations.
FDI inward stock FDI inflows (cumul over the period)
in % of GDP in % of CEECs' FDI inflowsPer capita
 
2.4.2. The sectoral decomposition 
FDI responds to two large motivations. They can be market-seeking (local market-
oriented) or efficiency-seeking (export-oriented). Local market-oriented FDI is set up by 
horizontally integrated MCNs to penetrate a market, increase their market share, diversify the 
source of sale, and minimize competition risk. Export-oriented subsidiaries are set up by a 
vertically integrated MNC in a host economy with the aim to lower production costs or to 
seek, secure and diversify resources24.  
As evidenced from Table 6, a non negligible amount of FDI in CEECs-4, Portugal and 
Greece is market-driven, as the share of FDI in services sectors stands between around 47 % 
(in Hungary) and 76 % (in Portugal)25. Proxy by the ratio of manufacturing FDI to total FDI, 
the share of FDI export-oriented is then correspondingly the lowest in countries like Portugal 
− and also Slovakia − and the highest in Hungary, followed by a group made of the Czech 
republic, Poland and Greece. Primary sectors have received few FDI compared to other 
sectors. 
As reported in Table 7, the inward FDI stock expressed in VA is particularly impressive 
in financial intermediation for all countries under study, as a result of massive foreign 
presence in banking sectors of those countries26. Figures are less impressive in manufacturing 
sectors, reflecting for a part, a lower foreign presence than in banking sector and for another 
part, low capital intensity of some manufacturing sectors.  
A comparison of Tables 5, 7 and 11 shows that labour productivity levels and growth 
tend to be positively correlated with the share of inward FDI stock in VA. For instance, a 
sector with high foreign penetration like transport equipment presents also high labour 
productivity levels and growth. However, relationships between the three variables are more 
intricated than simply stated above. Compare for instance the couple Poland/Slovakia. While 
                                                          
24 See Hunya and Geishecker (2005) and quoted references.  
25 Unfortunately, data on sectoral FDI are unavailable for Ireland and Spain. Researchers have recourse 
instead to sectoral employment in foreign firms to get insights on sectoral decomposition of FDI. See Table 12. 
26 Foreign banks account for around  90 % of total banking assets in the Czech republic, Slovakia and 
Greece; 70 % in Poland and Portugal; and 50 % in Hungary (ECB, 2005). 
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inward FDI stock accounts for 35 % of VA in Slovakia against 150 % in Poland, the levels of 
labour productivity in that sector is twice larger in Slovakia (and, labour productivity growth 
was higher in Slovakia than in Poland over 1995-2000). That means that while FDI in 
transport equipment has a positive impact on this sector as a whole in the two countries, 
effects of FDI within the sector have been different in Poland and Slovakia. Either Slovakian 
domestic-owned firms operating in this sector have been more able than the Polish ones to 
absorb positive spillovers due to the presence of foreign investors through imitation of 
productive process, backward/forward linkages etc. And/or, Polish firms operating in that 
sector were less able than the Slovakian ones to resist additional competitive pressures due to 
foreign presence, resulting in “market stealing”, a deterioration productivity of domestic-
owned firms etc. These two factors, nonexclusive one of the other, explain why a non-linear 
relationship may be observed between foreign penetration and growth in the host economy. 
Impact of FDI on local firms is thus an empirical matter, depending on firms' 
characteristics as well as on sectors' characteristics, in addition to country's characteristics. 
Based on micro-data of firms, a large empirical literature have been devoted to 
disentangle the impact of FDI according to ownership of firms. Focusing on studies based on 
CEECs, the following results emerge. 
All empirical studies find, except for Bulgaria and Romania, that firms under foreign 
control are more productive than those under domestic control, even after controlling for bias 
selection27 (Damijan and al., 2003). Put differently, the higher foreign ownership in CEECs, 
the higher productivity of the host economy. This finding, robust to different specifications, 
puts a country like Poland in a bad position, especially compared to Hungary, the Czech 
republic and Slovakia. 
The impact of FDI on domestic firms depends on the absorption capabilities of countries 
(or of its domestic-owned firms). Put differently, productivity levels of host countries (and/or 
its domestic-owned firms) must not be too far from those of the home country. Otherwise, 
“market stealing” effect dominates, as domestically owned firms are unable to face additional 
competition pressures. However, “market stealing” effect is found to be very sensitive to the 
specification. Related to that point, positive spillovers occur for firms engaged in R&D 
(Kinoshita, 2000 for the Czech republic; Bosco, 2001 for Hungary). That put again countries 
like Poland in a bad position due to its low level of R&D. 
This empirical literature shows also that trade contributes to technological transfer from 
abroad, explaining why Slovenia is not in a bad position in terms of productivity growth even 
if that country has received few FDI in the last decade compared to other CEECs (Damijan et 
al., 2003a, 2003b). Firms can gain significant productivity improvements from serving 
foreign markets, especially those of developed countries. That puts again Poland in a bad 
position, as regard its low degree of openness to foreign trade.  
                                                          
27 “Selection bias” refers to the idea that foreign investors tend to acquire more capital intensive and more 
efficient firms in terms of labour productivity. For instance, using a probit model to determine the probability of 
foreign investment choices, Damijan and al.(2005) find that labour intensive firms are less likely to be chosen by 
foreign investors while more capital, more skill intensive and more export oriented firms are found to be 
preferred.  
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Table 10: FDI inward stock by main activities  
(in%) 
 
Slovakia (2003) Rep.tchèque (2002) Hungary  (2002) Poland (2000) Greece (2002) Portugal (2000)
Primary sector 1% 1% 2% 1% 0% 1%
Agriculture & Fishing 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 1%
Extractive Industries 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Manufacturing industries 28% 35% 46% 36% 38% 19%
of which  Food products, Beverages & Tobacco 4% 4% 7% 8% 16% 3%
               Total textiles & wood products 1% 4% 2% 5% 2% 3%
               Total coke, chemicals, rubber  & plastic product 9% 6% 8% 7% 11% 4%
               Total metals & fabricated metal products 13% 5% 2% 2% 5% 2%
               Total electrical & optical & telecommunication equipment 4% 2% 12% 2% 1% 2%
               Total transport equipment 2% 6% 11% 5% 0% 2%
Electricity, gaz and water 11% 7% 4% 3% 0% 1%
Construction 1% 2% 1% 3% 2% 1%
Services sector 58% 54% 47% 57% 61% 76%
Trade & Repairs 20% 12% 9% 17% 10% 13%
Hotels & Restaurants 1% 1% 1% 1% 4% 2%
Transports& Communication 10% 14% 8% 10% 21% 4%
of which Transports 0% 3% 0% .. 2% 0%
               Telecommunications 9% 9% 7% .. 19% 3%
Financial Intermediations 22% 16% 8% 21% 21% 21%
of which Monetary intermediation .. 11% 6% .. 13% 10%
               Other financial Intermediation .. 1% 0% .. 4% 10%
               Insurance 3% 2% 1% .. 4% 1%
               Other financial Intermediation & Insurance 3% 4% 2% .. 8% 11%
Real Estate & Business Services 5% 9% 9% 8% 2% 35%
of which Real Estate 4% 4% 4% .. 1% 4%
Other Services 1% 3% 1% .. 2% 0%
Other not classified activities 0% 0% 1% 3% 0% 3%
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%  
Source: OECD, own computations. 
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Table 11: Stock of inward investment  
(in % of VA) 
 
Czech (2002) Slovakia (2001) Hungary (2002) Poland (2000) Portugal (2001) Greece (2002)
Total 52% 30% 62% 26% 29% 38%
Agriculture & Fishing 1% 1% 17% 0% 4% 0%
Extractive Industries 54% 25% 64% 3% ¨ 6%
Manufacturig industries 73% 42% 120% 37% 30% 96%
of which  'Food products, Beverages & Tobacco 74% 69% 98% 54% 28% 179%
               Total textiles & wood products 81% 42% 46% 24% 18% 14%
               Total coke, chemicals, rubber  & plastic product 113% 53% 89% 0% 71% 372%
               Total metals & fabricated metal products 37% 36% 57% 7% 20% 97%
               Total electrical & optical & telecommunication equipment 37% 11% 115% 87% 54% 58%
               Total transport equipment 95% 35% 229% 150% 51% 4%
 Electricity, Gaz & Water 83% 4% 73% 15% 9% 1%
Construction 15% 3% 10% 13% 4% 8%
Trade & Repairs 51% 47% 46% 9% 27% 26%
Hotels et Restaurants 27% 12% 29% 14% 19% 24%
Transports, Communication 64% 32% 58% 21% 17% 122%
Financial intermediation 236% 192% 127% 212% 100% 351%
Real estate & business services enterprises 35% 15% 31% 2% 81% 10%
Other services 8% 1% 2% 2% 0% 2%  
Source: OECD, own computations. 
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Table 12: Employment of foreign-owned firms in Ireland (2000) 
 
In % of total employment In % of total employment 
in foreign-owned firms of the sector
Food products, Beverages & Tobacco 11% 27%
Leather & Footwear & Lethar 3% 34%
Wood & Wood Products & Cork 1% 18%
Pulp & Paper Products, Printing & Publishing 6% 31%
Chemicals &Chemical products 15% 77%
Rubber & Plastics Products 3% 36%
Other non-metallic mineral products 1% 14%
Basic metals & Fabricated Metal products 29% 21%
Machinery & Equipment NEC 5% 45%
Office & Data Processing 15% 88%
Electrical  machinery & apparatus 8% 62%
Radio, TV and communications 10% 85%
Medical and optical equipment 12% 85%
Transport equipment 4% 56%
Manufacturing N.E.C; Recycling 2% 26%
Total 100% 48%
Source : Barry (2004).  
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3. Accounting the overall labour productivity differences 
 
To which extent the current productive structures are favourable to a process of 
convergence towards Ireland? This is an important issue, since the convergence rate across 
countries is found much larger in service sectors than in manufacturing ones by Nicoletti and 
Scarpetta (2003) over the 1980-1998 period. Bernard and Jones (1996) report even evidence 
of β-divergence, complemented by σ-divergence, in manufacturing sectors, robust to various 
measures of productivity over 1974-1992. Consequently, Bernard and Jones (1996) explain 
the findings of β-convergence at the macro-level (i.e. GDP level) by the growing share of 
service sectors in the total economy of OECD countries over the last decade. Focusing on 
manufacturing sectors, Moomaw and Yang (2004) find evidence of β-convergence as well as 
evidence of σ-convergence for almost manufacturing sectors over the last twenty years, 
similarly to Scarpetta and Nicoletti and (2003) 28. In fact, the absence of convergence in 
manufacturing sectors found by Bernard and Jones (1996) might be due to the fact that their 
time period covers coincidently the sub-period with no convergence, as evidenced at the 
macro-level in Table 2 for the EU-15 countries. Then, taken as granted the convergence of 
productivity in both manufacturing as well as services sector, the lower the differences of 
productive structures between CEECs and Ireland, the higher the prospect of an Irish catching 
up scenario. 
In this section, we assume implicitly that most of structural changes in CEECs have 
already occurred, such as current productive structures are rather a good predictor of future 
ones29. The argument is that the liberalising measures contained in the European Agreements 
have already encouraged the deployment of subsidiaries of EU-15 multinationals in the 
majority of the CEECs30. Due to sunk costs associated with FDI, no important reversals in 
FDI inflows are expected. Then, no substantial changes in productive structures will occur in 
the future. 
A simple way to answer the introductive question consists in adopting a decomposition of 
productive structures in the line of Nordhaus (1972). 
Assume that uA  denotes the overall labour productivity level in country u; uiY , the output 
in industry i in country u; uiL , the labour in industry i in country u and 
u
is , the share of 
employment in sector i in total employment of country u. 
 
The overall labour productivity level in country u is then : 
 
u
u ui
iu
i i
YA s
L
= ∑     (1) 
                                                          
28 In their basic estimates, the convergence rate across countries stands between 1.7 % (in food, beverages 
& tobacco) and 7.0 % (in pulp, paper and printing & publishing) with a corresponding figure of roughly 5 % for 
machinery & equipment as well as transport equipment.  
29 See Stephan (2002) for a similar assumption in evaluating catching up. Hunya and Geishecker (2005) 
argue that the bulk of FDI in CEECs already occurred.  
30 The “European Agreements” consist in a progressive trade liberalization between the signatory country 
and the EU. Beginning with Poland and Hungary late 1980s, all CEECs have signed such agreements around 
1993/1994. At the end of the 1990s, there were no longer tariffs on industrial products (though impediments to 
trade in agriculture and food processing remained).  
Sandrine Levasseur 
 29
where 
u
i
u
i
Y
L
is the labour productivity in industry i, weighted by the share of employment in 
industry i. 
With symmetric notations for country k, the difference of overall productivity level 
between countries u and k is given by u kA A− . 
The percent point contribution of each industry i to the overall labour productivity gap 
between countries u and k is given by: 
u k
u k u ki i
i i i i iu k
i i
Y YC A A s s
L L
= − = −
 
Using a Nordhaus (1972)’s decomposition, this contribution may be rewritten as: 
( )u k ku k ui i ii i i iu k k
i i i
Y Y YC s s s
L L L
⎛ ⎞= − − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (2) 
 
Summing across industries, we have then: 
( )u k ku k u k ui i ii i iu k k
i ii i i
Y Y YA A s s s
L L L
⎛ ⎞− = − − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑  
 
Rearranging, the difference of overall productivity level between countries u and k is : 
( ) ( )
}{ }{ }{ }{
u k k k k
u k u k u k ui i i
i i i i iu k k k k
i i ii i i
Y Y Y Y YA A s s s s s
L L L L L
Total effect Level effect Structural share effect Average share effect
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− = − − − − − −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
= − −
∑ ∑ ∑
 
 
The first sum or the “level effect” measures the impact of different labour productivity 
levels in a sector when the shares of that sector are assumed to be the same in the two 
countries.  
The second sum or the “structural share effect” captures the extent to which the 
productivity deficit in industry i in country u is dampened (or exacerbated) by the fact of 
having a higher (or lower) share in industries with above average productivity levels. 
The third sum is the residual “average share effect”, ensuring that the total contribution of 
each industry is equal to that given in equation (2) above. It is not very interesting for 
evaluating whether the industrial structure of a country is favourable or unfavourable to 
productivity performances, compared to another country.  
Then, following O'Mahony and de Boer (2002), an alternative consists in defining the 
contribution of each industry as:  
( )* u k k ku k ui i ii i i iu k k k
i i i
Y Y Y YC s s s
L L L L
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= − − − −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠  
 
Note that summing across industries, this alternative gives also * u ki
i
C A A= −∑ .
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But now, with *iC , we get a better measurement of the extent to which the industrial 
structure of a country is favourable or unfavourable to its relative productivity performance, 
with the two last terms right hand side encompassed within a single “share effect”. Thus, an 
industry i has a lower impact on the overall productivity gap if either that industry presents a 
productivity level which is close to the one of the comparator country or if it accounts for a 
high share in industries with above average productivity, or both. Moreover, the lower the 
“share effect”, the more similar the industrial structure of the two countries. 
The next charts show this decomposition, comparing Ireland to four individual CEECs 
and the remaining Cohesion countries, using the STAN database. Appendix presents data of 
the decompositions by sector. In this accounting exercise, we consider only the market 
economy which has been decomposed in 20 sectors, of which 13 manufacturing sectors and 4 
services sectors. Remaining sectors correspond to primary sector and then include agriculture. 
 
Considering Ireland as the basis country, it is worth noting the following points. 
• As a general feature, manufacturing sectors explain predominantly the market 
economy productivity gap with respect to Ireland, followed by finance & business services 
sectors. For instance, manufacturing  accounts for 57 % of the total Irish lead with respect to 
Hungary and finance & business services, for 18 % (see Tables A2  in the Annex). 
In general, other sectors do not contribute largely to productivity gap with respect to Ireland. 
The sole notable exception is agriculture for Poland and Greece, accounting for respectively 
16% and 15 % of the total Irish lead. 
• Albeit the “share effect” is found smaller than the “level effect”, the “share effect” is 
unevenly distributed across countries, lying between 1 % and 35 %. In this respect, countries 
may be classified in three groups. The first one with a “share effect” below 8 % of the “total 
effect” includes the Czech republic (1 %), Slovakia (4 %) and Hungary (9 %). Poland and 
Portugal constitutes the second group with a very close “share effect” in “total effect” of 
respectively 17 % and 16 %. Finally, the third group includes Spain and Greece accounting 
for 1/3 of the “total share”. 
• The finance & business services sectors contribute to a non negligible extent to the 
“share term”, especially in Spain and Greece. In these two countries, the “share term” of 
finance & business services sectors explain 50 % of the total “share term”.  
• Finally, it is worth noting that agriculture accounts for a large share of the “share 
term” in Poland and Greece. Combined with a higher lag in the “level term” for that sector, 
the total contribution of agriculture to the market economy productivity gap with respect to 
Ireland is then higher for Poland than for Greece. Importantly, without a so high share of 
employment in agriculture, Poland would not differ substantially from other CEECs-4 in 
terms of productive structures. 
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Spain/Ireland
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Similar decomposition can be done for manufacturing sectors according to their level of 
technological intensity. 
The percent point contribution of each technological level v to the manufacturing labour 
productivity gap between countries u and k is given by:  
 
u k
u k u kv v
v v v v vu k
v v
Y YC A A s s
L L
= − = −  
 
or, using the alternative decomposition of O'Mahony and de Boer (2002), by:  
 
 
( )u k k k* u k uv v vv v v vu k k k
v v v
Y Y Y YC s s s
L L L L
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= − − − −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 
 
with * k uv v v
v
C A A= −∑  
The interpretation is as follows. Manufacturing industries of technological level v have a 
 
lower impact on the manufacturing productivity gap if either those industries present 
productivity level which is close to the one of the comparator country or if they account for a 
high share of industries with above average manufacturing productivity, or both. Moreover, 
the lower the “share effect”, the more similar the technological structure of the two countries.
 Due to data availability, we consider only three levels of technological intensity, namely 
“low”, “medium/low” and “medium/high”. Put differently, v = 1, 2, 3. 
The next charts show this decomposition based on technological intensity, comparing 
Ireland to each CEECs-4 and remaining Cohesion countries (see also Table A3 in the 
appendix). 
 
At this quite high level of aggregation, the following results emerge. 
The “share effect” is found very negligible for all countries, including CEECs-4 and 
Cohesion countries. This is rather a surprising result, especially for manufacturing with 
medium/high technological intensity31. For the CEECs-4, the contribution of the “share term” 
to manufacturing productivity gap with respect to Ireland in medium/high technological 
intensity industries stands between 0 % (Slovakia and the Czech republic) and 2 % (Hungary). 
For other Cohesion countries, the correspondent figure is found the highest for Spain (4 %). 
These are very small figures. 
Another important result is that almost labour productivity gaps with respect to Ireland in 
medium/low technological industries no longer exist in CEECs-4 and other Cohesion 
countries. These gaps are not very high in low technological industries while those in 
medium/high technological industries are more sizable. For the CEECs-4, Portugal and 
Greece, the productivity gap in low technological industries with respect to Ireland is around 
15-20 %, meaning that their labour productivity in low technological industries reaches 
around 80-85 % of the one of Ireland. In medium/high technological industries, their labour 
productivity stands between 55 % and 65 %. Labour productivity gaps of Spain with respect 
                                                          
31 Note this may be due to the high level of aggregation.  
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to Ireland are more reduced than in the cases of CEECs-4, Portugal and Greece, whatever the 
level of technological intensity turning even in favour of Spain in the case of medium/low 
technological intensity. 
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Conclusion  
Based on descriptive statistics, very simple econometrical work as well as a pickup in 
previous empirical literature, this paper puts forward that FDI inflows are an important engine 
for catching up. In general, CEECs and Cohesion countries hosting FDI tend to grow faster 
than those receiving few FDI. Surely, our basic estimations (as in Section 1) do not control 
for other factors which may impact on growth like structural reforms and macroeconomic 
policies. These two latter factors had strong impact on economic performances of CEECs in 
the 1990s, whatever the degree of foreign ownership in the economy. Moreover, our basic 
estimates do not solve for causality issues. Higher growth due, for instance, to earlier 
structural reforms may attract FDI rather than FDI inflows causes higher growth. However, 
independently of this econometrical issue, we think that the Irish case is particularly 
illustrative of how FDI inflows may boost growth of a country as soon as its labour force is 
well-educated. It is worth noting that, following the post-world war II, a poorly educated Irish 
labour force, combined with protectionist policies, locked Ireland in a low agriculture-based 
growth while other Western Europe countries were resuming with higher growth. Then, a 
state funding of secondary-level education, associated with openness to trade and FDI, 
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succeed in attracting foreign investors which paved the way for industrialisation of Ireland 
(Barry, 2002). 
As a legacy of the socialist period, CEECs do not suffer from a deficit in well-educated 
labour force. Consequently, when CEECs opened up their economies to foreign investors, 
large capital inflows occurred, probably diverting some of them from Portugal32. The current 
slowdown of Portuguese may be explained in part by this diversion effect from CEECs, both 
on exports and FDI sides. Competing on similar markets, but with higher wages and lower 
human capital endowments than CEECs, Portugal has lost its “comparative advantage” with 
the entry of CEECs as a possible destination of export-oriented FDI while its EMU 
membership forbids a currency depreciation. Consequently, labour productivity growth has 
been lower in Portugal than in CEECs, as reported in Table 7. It follows that the relevant 
issue is not whether CEECs will follow an Irish or a Portuguese convergence scenario, but 
rather whether Portugal will converge or diverge towards CEECs. 
The level but also the sectoral composition of FDI are crucial to accelerate catching up. 
Especially, MNCs, by carrying out technically demanding production functions and engaging 
in higher VA activities such as R&D, upgrade the production capacities of CEECs and 
increase the share of technological goods produced by host countries. This latter point is 
clearly evidenced by the sector of transport equipment which received sizable amounts of FDI 
as a share of VA and shown dynamic labour productivity growth over the last decade (Tables 
11 and 7).  
At the same time, FDI is not a necessary condition for boosting growth, as illustrated by 
Slovenia. Indeed, as comparative data indicate, FDI in Slovenia so far has played a restrained 
role in comparison to other CEECs. This suggests that despite its primary importance, FDI 
acts as a substitute for domestic firms if the latter are not able to carry out restructuring 
sufficiently. In that country, openness to trade rather to FDI was the key factor to benefit from 
international spillovers. Especially, deeper trade integration with the EU allowed Slovenia to 
resume with sustained growth.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
32 Braconier and Ekholm (2001) find a diversion effect of FDI flows from Southern Europe towards CEECs 
using a firm-level dataset on the operations of Swedish multinational companies. They show that the expansion 
of employment in CEECs affiliates, which totalled 15,000 over 1990-1998, came at the expense of employment 
in Southern affiliates where employment fell by 14,000. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Table A1: Key statistics on new EU-members (compared to old members) 
 
 Population in 2004 GDP (at market price) in 2004 
 Thousands  In % of EU-25 EUR millions In % of EU-25 
European Union (UE-25) 460,278 100.0 10,359,732 100.0 
New members (UE-10) 74,101 16.1 475,946 4.6 
         Czech republic 10,202 2.2 86,239 0.8 
         Estonia 1,356 0.3 9,043 0.1 
         Cyprus 737 0.2 12,402 0.1 
         Latvia 2,313 0.5 11,024 0.1 
         Lithuania 3,439 0.7 17,926 0.2 
         Hungary 10,107 2.2 80,816 0.8 
         Malta 401 0.1 4,277 0.0 
         Poland 38,167 8.3 195,205 1.9 
         Slovenia 1,997 0.4 25,895 0.2 
         Slovakia 5,382 1.2 33,119 0.3 
Sources: ECB, Eurostat. 
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Tableau A2: Decomposition of overall labour productivity by sectors (with respect Ireland) 
Hungary (in % point) Total Levels Shares Hungary Sectors "Level effect "  "Share effect" 
Agricultural 0.5 0.7 0.2 Agricultural 1% 1% 0%
Mining 0.4 0.5 0.0 Mining 1% 1% 0%
Manufacturing 29.9 29.2 -0.8 Manufacturing 57% 53% -4%
Energy 0.4 0.8 0.4 Energy 1% 1% 1%
Construction 4.2 4.7 0.6 Construction 8% 9% 1%
Transport 2.6 2.6 0.0 Transport 5% 5% 0%
Finance & Business services 9.9 5.0 -4.9 Finance and business 18% 10% -8%
Total 53.9 49.1 -4.7 Total 100% 91% -9%
Czech republic (in % point) Total Levels Shares Czech republic Sectors "Level effect "  "Share effect" 
Agricultural -0.5 0.0 0.5 Agricultural -1% 0% 1%
Mining 0.2 0.3 0.1 Mining 0% 1% 0%
Manufacturing 30.1 29.2 -0.8 Manufacturing 55% 54% -2%
Energy -0.5 0.2 0.7 Energy -1% 0% 1%
Construction 4.0 4.4 0.4 Construction 7% 8% 1%
Transport 0.7 0.8 0.1 Transport 1% 2% 0%
Finance and business services 15.2 14.6 -0.6 Finance and business 28% 27% -1%
Total 54.6 53.9 -0.6 Total 100% 99% -1%
Slovakia (in % point) Total Levels Shares Slovakia Sectors "Level effect "  "Share effect" 
Agricultural -0.6 -0.6 0.0 Agricultural -1% -1% 0%
Mining 0.4 0.4 0.0 Mining 1% 1% 0%
Manufacturing 27.1 26.4 -0.7 Manufacturing 55% 51% -4%
Energy 0.9 1.0 0.0 Energy 2% 2% 0%
Construction 3.1 3.3 0.2 Construction 6% 7% 0%
Transport 0.8 1.2 0.3 Transport 2% 2% 1%
Finance and business services 12.9 11.0 -1.8 Finace and business se 26% 22% -4%
Total 50.2 48.1 -2.1 Total 100% 96% -4%
Poland (in % point) Total Levels Shares Poland Sectors "Level effect "  "Share effect" 
Agricultural 8.9 3.2 -5.8 Agricultural 16% 6% -10%
Mining 0.2 0.5 0.3 Mining 0% 1% 1%
Manufacturing 25.2 25.2 0.0 Manufacturing 45% 43% -2%
Energy 0.4 0.7 0.3 Energy 1% 1% 1%
Construction 2.8 2.0 -0.8 Construction 5% 4% -2%
Transport 3.4 3.2 -0.1 Transport 6% 6% 0%
Finance and business services 13.2 10.9 -2.4 Finance and business 24% 20% -4%
Total 55.8 46.2 -9.5 Total 100% 83% -17%
Contribution to total
Contribution to total
Contribution to total
Contribution to total
Labour productivity gap
Labour productivity gap
Labour productivity gap
Labour productivity gap
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Tableau A2: …/ … (continued) 
Spain (in % point) Total Levels Shares Spain Sectors "Level effect "  "Share effect" 
Agricultural -1 -0.5 0.5 Agricultural -5% -3% 2%
Mining 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 Mining 0% -1% -1%
Manufacturing 23.5 21.5 -2 Manufacturing 118% 107% -10%
Energy -1 -2 -1 Energy -5% -10% -5%
Construction 0.9 0.8 -0.2 Construction 5% 4% -1%
Transport -2.6 -2.7 -0.1 Transport -13% -13% 0%
Finance and business services 2.9 -0.3 -3.2 Finance and business 14% -2% -16%
Total 20.0 13.3 -6.7 Total 100% 67% -33%
Portugal (in % point) Total Levels Shares Portugal Sectors "Level effect "  "Share effect" 
Agricultural 2.7 1.6 -1.1 Agricultural 5% 3% -2%
Mining .. .. .. Mining .. .. ..
Manufacturing 29.4 27.2 -2.2 Manufacturing 57% 52% -4%
Energy -0.3 -0.4 -0.1 Energy -1% -1% 0%
Construction 4.3 4.4 0.1 Construction 8% 8% 0%
Transport 0.3 -1.8 -2.1 Transport 1% -3% -4%
Finance and business services 11.4 8.3 -3.1 Finance and business 22% 16% -6%
Total 52.0 43.6 -8.4 Total 100% 84% -16%
Greece (in % point) Total Levels Shares Greece Sectors "Level effect "  "Share effect" 
Agricultural 4.8 0.5 -4.3 Agricultural 15% 2% -13%
Mining 0.0 0.1 0.2 Mining 0% 0% 0%
Manufacturing 26.7 25.0 -1.8 Manufacturing 82% 76% -5%
Energy 0.1 0.3 0.2 Energy 0% 1% 1%
Construction -0.3 -0.6 -0.3 Construction -1% -2% -1%
Transport -0.7 -0.7 0.0 Transport -2% -2% 0%
Finance and business services 4.2 -1.1 -5.3 Finace and business se 13% -3% -16%
Total 32.8 21.4 -11.4 Total 100% 65% -35%
Reading the table: 
The overall lead of 53.9 percentage points is the (absolute) sum of 49.1 percentage points due to the "level term" and of 4.7 percentage points du to the
Source : STAN database; own computations.
Contribution to total
Contribution to total
Contribution to total
Labour productivity gap
Labour productivity gap
Labour productivity gap
"the share term". The total contribution of the "level term" to the overall Irish lead is then 91 % and the one of the "share term" 9 %. 
Considering sectors, the total contribution of agriculture to overall Irish lead  is 1 % and exclusively due to the "level term". 
Consider for instance the couple Hungary/Ireland. The figure  53.9 means that Ireland has a overall lead of 53.9 percentage points over Hungary in terms of 
overall productivity. But. the Irish lead is only 0.5 percentage point for agriculture.
 
. 
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Tableau A3: Decomposition of manufacturing labour productivity by technological 
intensity (2002) 
 
Hungary Total Level Share Sectors Level Share
Low tech 19.2 18.7 -0.5 31% 30% -1%
Medium/low 1.6 1.6 0 3% 3% 0%
Medium/high 40.8 39.8 -1 66% 65% -2%
Total manufacturing 61.6 60.1 -1.5 100% 98% -2%
Czech republic Total level share Total level share
Low tech 16.5 16.5 0 27% 27% 0%
Medium/low 1.5 1.5 0 2% 2% 0%
Medium/high 42.4 42.2 -0.3 70% 70% 0%
Total manufacturing 60.4 60.2 0.2 100% 100% 0%
Slovakia Total Level Share Sectors Level Share
Low tech 17.6 17.7 0.1 27% 28% 0%
Medium/low 2.1 2.0 -0.1 3% 3% 0%
Medium/high 44.5 44.6 0.2 69% 70% 0%
Total manufacturing 64.2 64.3 0.1 100% 100% 0%
Poland Total Level Share Sectors Level Share
Low tech 17.7 17.4 -0.3 28% 28% 0%
Medium/low 1.6 1.7 0.1 2% 3% 0%
Medium/high 43.7 43.1 -0.6 69% 69% -1%
Total manufacturing 62.9 62.2 -0.7 100% 99% -1%
Greece Total Level Share Sectors Level Share
Low tech 16.7 16.0 -0.7 28% 27% -1%
Medium/low 0.3 0.4 0.1 1% 1% 0%
Medium/high 41.9 40.5 -1.4 71% 69% -2%
Total manufacturing 58.9 56.9 -1.9 100% 97% -3%
Portugal Total Level Share Sectors Level Share
Low tech 16.7 16.0 -0.6 28% 27% -1%
Medium/low 0.9 1.0 0.0 2% 2% 0%
Medium/high 41.6 39.5 -2 70% 67% -3%
Total manufacturing 59.2 56.6 2,6 100% 96% -4%
Spain Total Level Share Sectors Level Share
Low tech 12.6 12,2 -0,5 28% 27% -1%
Medium/low -1.2 -1 0.2 -3% -2% 0%
Medium/high 33.8 32.1 -1.7 75% 71% -4%
Total manufacturing 45.2 43.3 -2 100% 96% -4%
Gap in % points of Ireland
Gap in % points of Ireland
Gap in % points of Ireland
Contribution:
Contribution:
Contribution:
Contribution:
Contribution:Gap in % points of Ireland
Gap in % points of Ireland
Gap in % points of Ireland
Contribution:
Gap in % points of Ireland Contribution:
 
 Source: STAN database; own computations. 
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Description of the STAN database 
 
Our primary data at the sectoral level are from the new OECD STAN (Structural 
Analysis) database. This database has been revised using new industrial classifications. While 
providing data on value added, employment, labour compensation, GFCF, imports, exports 
and so on at the sectoral level, this database limits our sample of CEECs to OECD members, 
namely the Czech republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Poland. 
One drawback of STAN database for own analysis is the absence of sectoral data on 
prices and gross output for Ireland and Portugal, which are our two main comparator 
countries. Consequently, the GDP deflator was used for both CEECs and Cohesion countries. 
GDP deflator provides then an inexact picture of sectoral productivity, as GDP deflator refers 
to prices of final manufactured goods which include distribution margins and are affected by 
international trade. GDP deflator is then no longer relevant for sectors or industries engaged 
in intermediate production. Especially, in agriculture and manufacturing industries, basic 
prices of output are preferable since the latter are those faced by producers (see O'Mahony 
and de Boer, 2002 for instance).  
Another main drawback is the absence of hour worked at sectoral level. As a result, we 
use data of employment (total number of persons engaged in production) for both CEECs and 
Cohesion countries to compute sectoral productivity. It follows that the latter are probably 
underestimated for CEECs where a significant proportion of the labour force is engaged in 
more than one job. For instance, 28 % of the Czech labour force still declared a 
supplementary activity in 1998, albeit the “transformational recession” of the early 1990s was 
far away (Cazes and Nesporova, 2004). Multiple-job holding may also account for high share 
of economically active population in other CEECs.  
One difficulty arises also from labour productivity in the services sector (even if non-
market sector are excluded), as assessment of production is not an easy task and is not yet 
fully harmonised across countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
